Overview of the Water Situation in Palestine

by Susan Koppelman

Introduction:

The Middle East region is recognized as the driest and most water scarce region in the world. The most significant sources of fresh water in Israel and Palestine are trans-boundary. Currently, Palestinians are facing extreme water scarcity, with an average per capita consumption well below WHO recommendations of 150 L/person/day.

Thirteen percent of the population in Palestine is not connected to the water network. Even communities connected to the network are not able to receive water thru their pipes. Mekorot, the Israeli water company who supplies 58% of Palestinian water used for domestic purposes often turns the water off during the summer months when it is the scarcest. Israeli settlers also tamper with the supply of some villages, turning the water off completely or tampering with the pipes so that only minimal water may flow thru. The Separation Barrier is separating many communities from their wells and springs. Inability to receive water thru the network, from local wells and springs, and lack of funding regionally to build enough rain harvesting cisterns forces families to purchase tanked water at prices double to water purchased thru the network.

Despite the aridity of the region, the water scarcity afflicting Palestinians is due primarily to inequitable distribution of resources. Capacity to manage water sustainably in Palestine is circumscribed and limited by Israeli control of the majority of the resource under the terms of Oslo II, and by Israeli Occupation practices. Sustainable water management must be a cooperative venture based on equitable distribution of resources, not domination and oppression.

The roots of the crisis:

In 1967, Israel took control of all water resources in the West Bank and Gaza with a series of military orders, establishing laws that forbid Palestinians from drilling new wells and rehabilitating old wells without approval from Israel. Since 1967, Palestinians have been denied any access to the water of the Jordan River. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994) ceded control of the water resources underlying the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Oslo II officially recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank but deferred definition and quantification to the Final Status Negotiations. Temporary provisions were made to provide an additional 28.6 MCM (million cubic meters) water yr-1 to the Palestinians, whilst each party maintained ‘current utilization’. The future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank were set at 70 – 80 MCM water yr-1, and it was agreed that Palestinians had permission to develop 78 MCM from the Eastern aquifer.

Problems with Oslo II:

In reality, Oslo II did not confer much control over water resources to the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). The West Bank Water Department (WBWD), in conjunction with Mekorot, retained control over a large proportion of water resources and infrastructure. Widespread poverty in the Palestinian population makes non-payment for water very common. High dependency on foreign funding has eroded the authority of the PWA and decentralized control over planning and development of infrastructure and resources. Even after Palestinians’ water rights were recognized under Oslo II, still no development of resources can take place without the approval of the JWC (Joint Water Council) – i.e. Israeli approval. The Water Officer of the Israeli Civil Administration retains an absolute veto over Palestinian development plans, even if they have been approved by the JWC.

Moreover, there are serious doubts that Palestinians can extract the water quantities specified in the agreement from the Eastern aquifer. There is an average annual drop of more than 25 cm in the water table level that is raising alarm about the sustainable yield of this aquifer. It is believed that the maximum amount that could be extracted is 15-25 MCM yr-1 (well below the 78 MCM yr -1 mentioned in Oslo II).

Allocations under Oslo II were supposed to be temporary, and were not to prejudice final status negotiations. These negotiations should have taken place before 2000. Allocations do not take account of long term population expansion, or make allowances for industrial and agricultural development.

Current Water Supply in the West Bank:

•Total yield from Palestinian controlled water sources is currently 104.9 MCM yr-1, this is 11% less than in 1995.
•26% of total water consumed (58% of domestic use water) is purchased from Mekorot.
•Palestinians are losing access to large numbers of wells and springs due to the building of the Separation Barrier.
•More than 13% of the population are not connected to any form of water network.
•Between 30-50% of water is lost thru the network due to leaks
•Tanked water costs twice as much as water purchased from the network.

Crisis in the West Bank:

Water shortage continues to be a problem for many communities in the West Bank. There is an urgent need to develop new resources, expand the distribution network and rehabilitate the old networks. The sewage treatment sector is seriously under-developed. Since Israel continues to veto or stall the development of new water resources and the rehabilitation of old networks, and, moreover, is withholding tax revenue belonging to the PA, there is a need for both advocacy and investment.

Current Water Supply in Gaza:

•Extraction from the Gaza Aquifer is about twice the available recharge.
•The water level is dropping by around 20-30 cm per year.
•Only 10% of drinking water wells meet WHO standards.
•Mekorot has reduced supply of water to communities in Gaza since 2000, breaching the Oslo Agreement.
•Wastewater treatment facilities are inadequate and 80% is discharged untreated into the environment.

Crisis in Gaza:

It was widely recognized in the 1990s that the environmental situation re: the Gaza Aquifer was urgent and needed to be addressed. A plan was drawn up in 2000 by engineering consultants funded by USAID, for integrated Aquifer Management. Since the outbreak of the Intifada, no progress has been made on implementing it, and USAID have since pulled out of the sector.

Operation Summer Rains:

Operation Summer Rain has put back the process of Water Sector Development in Gaza by several years. Several major drinking water and sewage pipelines are known to have been hit. Destruction of the Gaza Electric Power Station has put sewage treatment plants and drinking water wells and pumping stations out of action. Most Gazans only have three hours of water per day. It will cost millions of dollars simply to return systems to the state they were in before June 2006. Direct damage to the water systems is probably less serious than the derailing of development projects that would have prevented further degradation of the Aquifer.

Options for Gaza:

•Import water from Israel/Egypt
•Build desalination plants for brackish water and seawater
•Treat wastewater and reuse it for irrigation
•Increase rainwater harvest
•Build a pipeline between the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Options for the West Bank:

Increase rainwater harvesting.
•Harvest surface run-off.
•Treat and reuse wastewater for irrigation.
•Continue to develop the Eastern Aquifer.
•Negotiate with Israel to gain water rights to the Mountain Aquifer and Jordan River.

Options for Israeli Concessions:

•Stop extracting water from inside the West Bank (60 MCM /year), or compensate Palestinians with an equal amount from the Israeli National Water Carrier (e.g. for Gaza/Jenin).
•Quit-claim on the Eastern and Northern Aquifers, which are predominantly inside Palestinian territory (143 MCM/ year).
•Quit-claim on the Western Aquifer (340 MCM/yr).
•Recognize Palestinian water rights on the Jordan River (approximately 240 MCM/yr).

Options for Israel:

Any water concession to the Palestinians will necessitate Israel either using less fresh water or finding alternative resources. The Israeli farming sector uses a very large amount of fresh water each year (580 MCM), but contributes only around 2% to the GDP. Israeli wastewater treatment and reuse technology is state of the art. Israel could increase wastewater treatment/reuse or decrease irrigated agriculture. Israeli desalination technology is also fairly advanced and could be used to provide more water. Import of water from Turkey and/or Egypt and the building of a canal from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea are two other highly costly and unsustainable options that Israel has been seriously considering.

Conclusions:

Communities in Palestine are suffering from a water crisis that is a direct result of inequitable distribution of resources. In reality, the majority of water resources are under Israeli control. The amount of water available to Palestinians is being steadily reduced: by military closures, confiscation of wells, the Separation Barrier, and directly by Mekorot. Israeli Military actions are deeply destructive to water infrastructure. This has been the case throughout the Intifada, and in particular, more recently in Gaza. There is an urgent need to address the situation in Gaza, where there is simply not enough water to meet the basic needs of the population. Water needs to be made available from other sources.

Lack of access to water is severely damaging the Palestinian agricultural sector, and as a result, both the food security and economic well-being of the population. Given that Oslo II was a temporary agreement, Palestinian water rights must be renegotiated to allow equitable and reasonable utilization, in line with international law. These negotiations cannot wait for a more comprehensive peace agreement to be reached. In fact, negotiation of the water situation is integral to peace in this region.

Palestinian water rights to the Jordan River need to be addressed within a multilateral framework, with participation from all riparians to ensure protection and sustainable utilization of the resource. Sustainable management of resources shared between Palestinians and Israelis cannot be achieved without cooperation from Israel. This provides an opportunity to foster peace and cooperation in the region. However, given the history of past attempts at ‘cooperation’ and the urgency of impending and existing humanitarian and environmental crises, the participation of the international community in brokering deals and monitoring compliance is necessary.